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Abstract— In this paper we demonstrate our signature based 
detector for self-propagating worms. We use a set of worm and 
benign traffic traces of several endpoints to build benign and 
worm profiles. These profiles were arranged into separate n-
ary trees. We also demonstrate our anomaly detector that was 
used to deal with tied matches between worm and benign trees. 
We analyzed the performance of each detector and also with 
their integration. Results show that our signature based 
detector can detect very high true positive. Meanwhile, the 
anomaly detector did not achieve high true positive. Both 
detectors, when used independently, suffer high false positive. 
However, when both detectors were integrated they 
maintained a high detection rate of true positive and 
minimized the false positive. 
Keywords: self-propagating worm, worm detector, signature 
based detector, anomaly detector. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The term “malware” refers to threats posed from code 
execution that causes damage or renders the system security 
useless [1]. In the early computer age, malware were created 
with limited objectives, whereas recent paradigms are also 
driven by profit-gain and information-gain motives. While 
some malware remain stationary until it is triggered, worms, 
such as Code Red, Witty, Nachi, MyDoom, SoBig, Zotob, 
Witty, Blaster are kind of malware that self-propagate from 
one host to another [2]. 
 In this paper, we present a framework for detecting self-
propagating worms using signature based and anomaly 
detectors. The contributions of this paper are as follows: we 
present a data mining approach for detecting self-
propagating worms using benign and worm tree to form a 
signature based detection. We created our own tree structure 
based on a generic framework to store those signatures. 
When a tie-break is needed, an anomaly-based detection is 
used to make a final decision whether a given signature 
should be deemed as worm or benign. The anomaly detector 
bases its decision on comparing a signature against 
signatures in a fix-sized window of recent sessions. We 
report the result of both detectors and their integration and 
also compare their performance against some related work in 
the literature. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Basically there are several types of intrusion/malware 
detections [3-5], namely anomaly detection, signature based 
detection integration of both of these (called hybrid 
detection); and specification based detection. 
Anomaly detector flags any activity that behaves or runs 
differently from the recorded profile. Although it has the 
ability in detecting novel attacks, it tends to generate high 
rate of false alarms. However, some authors [6], [7] claim 
that their anomaly detector alone could achieve outstanding 
results.  
Signature based detection is a renowned detection type 
for malware and intrusion detections that uses known rules to 
detect known and unknown patterns, but share some 
characteristics to be detected. Basically a signature based 
detection represents knowledge in the form of “if 
<condition> then <conclusion>”. However this technique is 
susceptible to a slight variation of the attack signature and 
also to an unknown attack. 
Lakhina et al. [8] used entropy as a tool to detect 
anomalous traffic based on features of IP and port 
distributions. They claimed that using feature distributions 
can naturally divide anomalous from benign traffic and also 
uncover new anomaly types. The outcome of their 
experiment indicated that feature distribution is a key 
element to achieve a promising performance. However, their 
technique does not take into consideration the value of the 
features. For instance, there were repetitive port distributions 
over time; they did not take the values of the port into 
account when they used that technique.  
Khayam et al. [6] proposed the use of Kullback-Leibler 
(KL) divergence measure to quantify perturbations in port 
distribution. KL is an information theoretic measure of the 
closeness between two probability distributions. They 
measured the perturbation of traffic in time-based windows. 
The basic idea of the technique is that they used the value 
they got in perturbation caused by worms, and compared it 
against existing recorded normal port distributions. Although 
they achieved 100% accuracy at most of the endpoints, their 
technique suffers from worms that propagate at a very low 
rate. 
Shafiq et al. [7] suggested that intelligent consideration 
of several traffic features could improve detection. The 
features to be considered include burstiness of session 
arrivals, spikes in traffic volume, entropy of destination IP 
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addresses, and divergence of port distribution. They 
considered fixed time windows of 30 seconds.  
The time based window approach shows impressive 
outcomes but at some costs. Its drawback is that the cost to 
analyze a collection of ports in a window is much larger than 
using fix-sized window. Also, a dependency on an anomaly 
detector alone will make the cost consistently imposed to the 
system. Hence, we interested to evaluate the detection 
performance by using a fix-sized window rather than time 
based window, as implemented by previous authors. We are 
also interested to use signature based detector and only 
invoke the anomaly detector at certain conditions. 
 Abbess et al. [9] proposed a combination of pattern 
matching and protocol analysis approaches. The first method 
worked on multi-pattern matching strategy. The latter used a 
decision tree that was adaptive to the characteristic of the 
network traffic.  
Williamson [10] proposed a rate limiting behavior to 
detect scanning viruses at host level. Their detection was 
simple with the assumption that scanning viruses will 
actively attempt to contact many computers in the network. 
This will usually cause a burst in the intensity of requests to 
make outgoing connections. 
 Gu et al. [11] measured the maximum entropy 
estimation of network traffic to get a baseline traffic 
distribution and relative entropy which were used to detect 
anomalous traffic. 
Honeypot is also another strategy in detecting worm and 
intrusive activities. It is one or a set of machines deployed as 
a tool for a larger detection system to detect, analyze, and 
gather intelligence about attack activities. Honeystat [12] is 
one example. 
III. THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM  
Our detection system as depicted in Fig. 1, suggests that 
all incoming sessions will undergo checking against the 
benign and worm trees. These trees are decision trees, 
integrated as a signature based detector. Note that the trees 
use a signature which is split into 5 parts. When an incoming 
signature to be tested in the trees, it will be split into 5 parts 
first and each part will be matched against those parts 
available in the trees. In order to have a perfect match 5/5 
rate in the trees, the detector may need to search the entire 
nodes. Having lesser match rate will shorten the searching 
effort.  
We tested match rate 3/5, 4/5 and 5/5 and discovered that 
4/5 is the best setting to achieve a good accuracy while 
reducing the searching cost. Thus, 4 is set as a minimum 
threshold T. The total matches returned by a tree when 
comparing the 5 parts of the signature is denoted as D. Given 
T=4, if the benign tree produces a match rate D/5 that 
surpasses a preferred threshold D>=T while the worm tree 
produces a match rate lesser than D/5, the session will be 
allowed to pass. When the worm tree recorded a match rate 
D/5 that surpasses a preferred threshold D>=T while the 
benign tree produces a match rate lesser than D/5, the session 
will be blocked. If both trees return rates where none of them 
surpass the required threshold, the anomaly detector will 
have its final say. The same would also be undertaken if both 
trees have tied match rates even though the threshold was 
surpassed. Details of the anomaly detector will be explained 
in section IV. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Classification system 
IV. METHODOLOGY & ANALYSIS METHOD 
We rely on session based information of endpoints to 
detect a self propagating worm. In our work, an endpoint 
refers to an individual computer system or device that acts as 
a network client and serves as a workstation or personal 
computing device [13]. This section describes the details of 
our work. 
A. Data Collection 
We obtained a dataset from [14] as used by [6,7]. They 
collected network profiles from 13 endpoints for over 12 
months. Those endpoints’ records consist of session traffic of 
home users, research students, technical staff and 
administrative staff. A session is defined as a two-way 
communication between two IP addresses. The dataset had a 
total signature of 1,881,234 benign sessions. The session 
data had the following 6 fields [7]: 
• Session id: 20-byte SHA-1 hash sub names of host 
and remote IP address. 
• Direction: a byte flag of 4 types; incoming/outgoing 
unicast, incoming/outgoing broadcast. 
• Protocol; packet’s transport layer protocol. 
• Source port: packet’ source port. 
• Destination port: packet’s destination port. 
• Timestamp: millisecond resolution of session 
initiation. 
Their worm dataset contained a total of 1,437,119 session 
signatures from 12 different types of worms. They were: 1) 
Blaster, 2) Dloader-NY, 3) Forbot-FU, 4) MyDoom-A, 5) 
Rbot-AQJ, 6) RBOT.CCC, 7) Sdbot-AFR, 8) Sim Src Port, 9) 
CodeRed II, 10) Witty, 11) SoBig.E, and 12) Zotob.G. 
B. Dataset Transformation 
We replaced the long session identifiers with unique 
integer values. We also decided to choose only the first five 
fields for our analysis. 
 If the same data is used to build and evaluate the 
detectors, the results would be unrealistic. Therefore, to 
evaluate the ability of the detectors to classify new and 
unseen sessions, we split the datasets, worm and benign 
respectively, into training and testing sets using a k-fold 
cross validation scheme where k=10. 
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C. Tree Structure 
In our discovery oriented data mining method with n-
nary worm and benign trees [15], new arriving sessions will 
be searched for matches inside the large pool of existing 
signatures stored in those trees.  
Those worm and benign trees were constructed using the 
training datasets from the k fold sets. The ID3 [15], and its 
variants decision tree’s induction algorithms were well 
developed to operate on generalized rules. In our case we 
needed to have an n-ary tree structure used to store the 5 
parts of a given signature; each node was required to keep 
one part of the signature respectively. A simple hash table 
can also be used but we postponed that for future work.  
A rule contains 5-fields added under the root node. Each 
field of the rule was stored into a single node in a right 
sequence. If two or more similar rules added into the tree, the 
existing nodes containing matching parts were reused 
whenever possible. Only the different parts were constructed 
as new nodes in the tree. The bottom most nodes were also 
merged, to represent consecutive ranges of values in a single 
node by storing the lower bound (LB) and the upper bound 
(UB) of the range. This will ensure that the size of the tree is 
always minimized at the lowest level nodes (upper level 
nodes could be merged in a similar way; this is future work). 
E.g.: given four rules (4.6.1034.1.1158), (4.6.1034.1.1168), 
(4.6. 1034.1.1169) and (4.6.1034.1.1170), we can construct 
the tree shown in figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Sample worm tree structure 
We identified the least varied field to be the first child 
node in the sequence, followed by the larger ones. We found 
that the following sequence of a rule was the best order: 
(direction, protocol, destination port, session id, source port). 
We also merged the bottom most nodes in the tree so that 
any continuous number could be put into range of numbers 
having a lower bound and upper bound stored in a single 
node. The impact on minimum or no redundant rule is vital 
in reducing the search space in the pattern matching phase.  
A drawback of this tree-based structure is that two or 
more rules that differ only at a higher level will be replicated 
entirely at lower levels. Another drawback of using trees is 
the cost taken to process the training data to build the trees. 
However, the overhead is quickly balanced by a speedier 
detection [10]. 
D. Training and Testing Datasets 
The worm and benign trees were constructed using the 
training datasets, using a k-fold (k=10) cross validation 
scheme. The data was divided into ten subsets. Each subset 
was held out in turn to be a testing set; performance on that 
testing set was evaluated using worm and benign trees 
constructed using the other 90% of the data.  
When building the trees, we limited the number of 
training samples of every endpoint and worm used in each k 
to the first block of 1000 or 10000, if the total signatures 
were greater than 10000.  
To form testing sets, for each k set, we inserted a sum of 
about 2040 or 6240 depending on the total size of the benign 
size from the k set and non-overlapping testing worm 
signatures into endpoint sessions. Each worm signature was 
inserted into the benign endpoint sessions at a random 
interleaved size of minimum 3 and maximum 5. Taken from 
the k set, we set only 30 signatures for the first worm, 100 
for the next 5 worms and the remaining worms were set to 
1000 signatures each. 
E. The Signature Based Detector  
Searching for matching patterns in a huge tree based 
structure can be too costly if the search strategy is not 
meticulously designed. A simple search can be quickly 
accomplished if a search condition is to find the next part of 
a signature given only that the current part of the signature 
matches. Otherwise, if a search condition is to find the next 
part of a signature regardless of whether the current part of 
the signature matches or not, the search needs to traverse 
either all nodes in the tree or enough of the tree until the 
required detection rate is obtained. Since we wanted the 
second condition to apply, we introduced a minimum 
detection threshold of T=4.  
That will minimize the need to check all nodes in the 
trees, and in many cases the search may not even traverse 
half the size of the tree e.g.; when a detection rate is already 
obtained. If our system is implemented at the host level, the 
size of the benign tree was not too large, assuming that most 
of everyone’s PC is not shared and everyone gets attached to 
only a set of websites or other Internet-based services. If this 
system is implemented at the gateway level, the trees should 
only maintain small amount of recent data.  
It was possible also to have a simple search with earlier 
condition but we needed to build more trees amounted as 
factorial to the number of the field in a signature where each 
tree will have field values uniquely permutated. However, 
we decided to consider that option for future work. 
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F. The Anomaly Detector 
We discovered that some signatures were found as 
benign and worm at the same time. As the signature-based 
detector could not make a decision, an anomaly detector that 
analyzed recent traffic could help to finalize the tie-break.  
In data mining [16], the window based technique called 
sliding window model is a technique that is ideal to analyze 
stream data. The technique observes patterns in recent data, 
rather than the entire streams seen so far. A long stream of 
traffic contains patterns that change over time, so reliance on 
the entire stream to make a decision is unreliable. Instead the 
decision is based on recent data. 
We investigated the effectiveness of the entropy 
technique and we discovered that entropy could only suggest 
how much an entire window of signatures is different from a 
normal window. An entropy value does not tell us whether 
one questionable session in a particular window is benign or 
worm. However, we noticed that the calculations towards 
getting an entropy value are very useful to give the answer 
that we are interested in. Therefore, we included that 
algorithm for our anomaly detector. 
Regardless of whether the tree based detector is able to 
make a decision or not, we always maintained the most 
recent window of w sessions in a buffer. As a new session 
appeared, it was stored into the buffer and the oldest session 
in the buffer was removed. Each time the anomaly detector 
was invoked, it used the sessions stored in the buffer to draw 
its conclusion. 
We considered the frequency of port numbers in the 
buffer. If the session in question had port numbers matching 
those with the highest frequency in the window, and some 
other conditions were met, the session was considered a 
worm, otherwise it was considered benign. 
We experimented with several conditions: 
• Should there be a minimum frequency of matching 
port numbers, in a fixed window of w sessions, to 
deem a session as a worm? (One fifth of the window 
size was used for the minimum.) 
• Should there be a maximum frequency of matching 
port numbers, in a fixed window of w sessions, to 
deem a session as a worm? (One third of the window 
size was used for the maximum.) 
• Considering source and port destination numbers 
separately, should they both suggest that a session is 
a worm to deem it to be a worm, or is one enough? 
• Windows of 15, 20, 30 and 40 sessions were tested 
in this study. 
G. Performance measures 
We evaluated the performance of the classification 
system based on its rates on: 
• True Positive (TP): The fraction of worm traffic 
correctly classified as worms. 
• False Negative (FP): The fraction of benign traffic 
wrongly classified as worms. 
V. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
We evaluated the performance of our system using each 
combination of parameter values, and performed an analysis 
of variance to identify which parameters made a difference 
to TP and/or FP. Whether one or both ports needed to match 
made a difference in many situations. Requiring both to 
match lowered both TP and FP. On balance, requiring only 
one to match seems best, as that way the TP rate goes up to 
over 90%. The use of minimum and maximum frequencies 
together made a difference in some endpoints. It either made 
no difference, or if it did make a difference the best 
performance comes a window size of 40, a minimum 
frequency of 8, and a maximum of 13. Thus, the best way to 
configure the system appears to be with these parameter 
values just: window size of 40, and only one port is enough 
to deem a worm. With this configuration, the performance 
for each endpoint is shown in Table I. The TP rate is over 
90% for 8 of 13 endpoints. For the other 5 it ranges from 
74% to 82%. The FP rate varies. It is particularly good at 
endpoint 13. It is unusually high at endpoints 5 and 10. 
Endpoint 10 has very high TP and also high FP. 
Detection based only on Anomaly does badly with TP 
and only attains 50% on two endpoints. Detection based only 
on signature does very well for TP, but also produces high 
FP rates on many endpoints. Hence, the anomaly detector 
does really have a significant role to bring the FP rate under 
control while achieving good TP rate. Overall TP rate 
averages 88%, overall FP rate averages 12%. 
TABLE I.  PERFORMANCES BASED ON ENDPOINTS 
 True Positive False positive 
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1 0.403 0.985 0.813 0.171 0.238 0.135 
2 0.072 0.987 0.737 0.090 0.577 0.154 
3 0.224 0.933 0.788 0.093 0.228 0.055 
4 0.307 0.999 0.817 0.383 0.249 0.110 
5 0.211 0.984 0.902 0.055 0.616 0.291 
6 0.164 0.931 0.774 0.195 0.403 0.092 
7 0.087 0.973 0.919 0.196 0.427 0.120 
8 0.121 0.998 0.986 0.293 0.207 0.087 
9 0.285 0.964 0.905 0.165 0.282 0.071 
10 0.157 1.000 0.998 0.198 0.684 0.268 
11 0.519 0.977 0.906 0.061 0.633 0.057 
12 0.045 1.000 0.974 0.198 0.345 0.143 
13 0.561 0.999 0.944 0.025 0.220 0.013 
Mean 0.243 0.979 0.882 0.163 0.393 0.123 
 
The performance for each separate worm is shown in 
Table II. The FP rate per worm basis is very stable, at about 
10% for every worm. The type of worm does not make much 
difference to FP rates, with any type of detector. TP rate 
varies enormously. MyDoom-A, Sim Src Port, CodeRed II 
and Witty have poor TP rates, especially MyDoom-A and 
CodeRed II. Signature based detection has high TP rates for 
all worms except CodeRed II.  
TABLE II.  PERFORMANCES BASED ON WORM 
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 True Positive False positive 
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1 0.275 0.998 0.959 0.156 0.364 0.108 
2 0.125 0.996 0.898 0.149 0.373 0.106 
3 0.207 1.000 0.994 0.159 0.376 0.116 
4 0.035 0.914 0.208 0.152 0.372 0.107 
5 0.133 0.988 0.821 0.155 0.378 0.107 
6 0.232 0.992 0.981 0.155 0.384 0.107 
7 0.388 0.999 0.994 0.151 0.391 0.113 
8 0.528 1.000 0.572 0.137 0.419 0.118 
9 0.398 0.655 0.331 0.135 0.385 0.087 
10 0.531 1.000 0.635 0.134 0.372 0.100 
11 0.361 0.997 0.984 0.135 0.324 0.086 
12 0.217 0.999 0.992 0.143 0.315 0.078 
Mean 0.286 0.962 0.781 0.147 0.371 0.103 
 
Figure 3 and 4 shows a comparison of our system with 
Khayyam et al.’s K-L/SVM [7] Maximum Entropy [18], and 
Rate Limiting [11]. The figures show the results per endpoint 
ID. However, the endpoint IDs of ours may not accurately 
match with others because the labels in the dataset were 
changed since we received the dataset from [15]. 
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Figure 3.   True positive rate  
The signature based detector alone produced high TP but 
also high FP. It was because sessions coexisted in worm and 
benign datasets. Also, when the training and testing data was 
split, there was lack of representation of training data in the 
testing data because the data pattern were not well 
distributed over a wide range of the dataset due to pseudo-
random behavior of users who used the endpoints over time.  
Meanwhile, the anomaly detector alone did not really 
perform well. It caused low TP. This is due to the use of a 
fixed size window, which prevented the detector from 
detecting abnormal sessions’ intensity over a time window 
using the same anomaly detection algorithm. When we 
integrated both detectors, their strengths were complemented 
by each other. 
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Figure 4.  False positive rate 
Merging the nodes operations at lowest level nodes in 
both trees did not reduce many nodes. From 2,427,795 
benign signatures used in the entire endpoints and their k 
sets, only 15903 nodes was cut off. That is equivalent to only 
0.0065%. With average=122.3 and standard 
deviation=186.1, most of the cut off nodes were from 
endpoint 3, 6, 8, and 9 while others almost 0.  
From 13,336,713 worm signatures used in the entire k 
sets, only 117 nodes were cut off. That was equivalent to 
only 0.0000087%. The cut off nodes were well balance 
across endpoints with average=0.9 and standard 
deviation=0.3 indicating that those worms generated unique 
signatures. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we present results of an experiment that 
employed a signature based detector and anomaly detector. 
We explored the performances of the systems by testing 
them with several different settings. We discovered that with 
certain settings, the proposed signature based detector 
managed to detect worms at a very good rate but at a high FP 
rate. While an anomaly detector alone is also weak, the 
integration of both detectors working in tandem formed a 
stronger detection mechanism. 
The main result of this paper is that by combining more 
than one malware detection scheme, the resulting detection 
can be greatly strengthened. This suggests a way forward to 
provide the next generation of malware detection. 
Our future work includes investigating the use of a 
window of a fixed duration, rather than a window containing 
a fixed number of sessions. We also would like to investigate 
the performance in term of loading and searching speeds 
when using the tree and the hash table. 
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